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Preface
Léna Soler
LHSP – Archives H. Poincaré (UMR 7117),
CNRS – Université de Lorraine, IUFM de Lorraine (France)
The point of departure of this volume has been a conference, “From Practice to
Results in Logic and Mathematics”, organized by the PratiScienS group in June
2010 in Nancy. The present volume does not contain, properly speaking, the
proceedings of this conference. Indeed, the book is the result of a separate call
for papers, and there is no exact coincidence between the papers it includes
and the contributions of the initial conference. Nevertheless, the conference
and this volume have been initiated in the same spirit and with the same
motivations. These are the spirit and motivations of the PratiScienS project
so as a matter of preface, I would like to say a few words about them.
PratiScienS stands for ‘Rethinking Sciences from the Standpoint of
Scientific Practices’. The project started in 2007 and is pursued by a small
interdisciplinary group of France-based historians, philosophers and sociolo-
gists of science (where ‘science’ must be understood here in a sense which
includes mathematics and logic in addition to the empirical sciences). The ge-
neral idea is to achieve a fine-grained characterization of the actual practices
of scientists, and to investigate philosophically significant issues about these
practices (such as the issue of robustness, that is, how something acquires the
status of a robust result in the empirical and the formal sciences 1, or the issue
of the contingency/ inevitability of robust scientific achievements).
The investigation of these issues requires a methodological reflection on the
means and difficulties that a study of scientific practices implies, and the deve-
lopment of exploratory tools suitable for each scientific field. It also requires a
clarification of what it means to study a scientific field from the standpoint of
practices, including an analysis of what a practice is, of how to conceptualize a
scientific practice, how to individualize (that is, identify) this or that scientific
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practice as one unitary practice, and so on. Quite astonishingly, these questions
are rarely addressed, despite the fact that even a superficial look to the exis-
ting studies conducted under the heading of ‘practices’ reveals heterogeneous
and possibly conflicting underlying answers to them.
The exploration of such questions involves the specification of the kinds
of studies that are commonly contrasted to practice-based inquiries of science
(be it with respect to their aims, their scope, their methods or the kind of ac-
counts they produce). When we scrutinize the way this contrast appears in the
literature, we meet important distinctions such as : (a) Practices as processes,
dynamical actions and procedures, contrasted with the propositional products
of these practices (theories, experimental facts, results of a mathematical theo-
rem, etc.) ; (b) Ongoing, day-to-day, real-time actual science (science as it is
really practiced, science in action) contrasted with science as it is a poste-
riori reconstructed by practitioners, notably in their publications ; (c) Real
science opposed to idealized accounts provided by philosophers—most of the
time in a derogatory sense of the term ‘idealized’, that is, in a sense implying
the allegation to have produced a one-sided and truncated, if not a comple-
tely deceitful account of what practitioners indeed do and what the science
under scrutiny really is. . .
Further work is needed in order to progress in these questions. This is
already the case for the practice-based studies of the empirical sciences, but
this is even more required when the target is the formal sciences, because after
the 1980s, in the first decades of the so-called ‘practice turn’, the practice-
based investigations of science have been primarily, if not exclusively, focused
on empirical sciences (and first of all on experimental fields exemplified by
experimental physics, prototypically, through laboratory studies of physics in
action). Mathematics has not often been the targeted object of such kinds of
inquiries, let alone logic. Actually, the mainstream philosophy of mathematics
and logic has remained mostly focused on foundational issues, probably for
reasons that have to do with the common idea of mathematics as the domain
of necessary truths established once for all through deductive, apodictic proofs.
This being said, in the last decades, a growing interest in mathemati-
cal and logical practices has become more and more tangible. Practice-based
approaches of mathematics have been valued as fruitful by more and more
scholars, and more and more work has been done under the banner of ma-
thematical practice. A similar, although delayed and more timid movement
can be noticed in the case of logic. So it seems that we are in the pro-
cess of an important methodological shift in the philosophical investigations
of mathematics and logic.
This methodological shift has all chances to go with a renewal of the current
philosophical conceptions of mathematics and logic : in the same manner as
practice-based studies of the natural sciences have transformed the image of
physics and other experimental sciences, practice-based studies of mathematics
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and logic should enrich and modify our ideas about mathematics and logic.
To contribute to this shift was the main motivation for the organization of
the 2010 conference. The present volume, I hope, will help to get a better
sense of the central issues, exploratory methods and dominant trends in the
practice-oriented studies of mathematics and logic today.
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